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Abstract 
 
Enlightenment, natural law and economic liberalism engendered the grand concept of modern private 
law. Nearly simultaneously the ongoing process of industrial revolution paved the path into another 
modernity. Its new paradigms were technical risks, enterprises and insurance. Insurability of losses 
caused by risky commercial activities created the demand for ‘stricter’ forms of liability beyond fault. 
The paper presents three different answers to these challenges to civil responsibility. Germany is but a 
prominent example for the continental EU member states with its mixed system of social insurance, 
special legislation on strict liability and general fault liability. The US adheres to the negligence 
system with only marginal corrections. The liability law of the new Russian civil code combines the 
French and German legal legacy with the revolutionary ideas of the 1922 code leading to two general 
clauses of quasi-strict and strict liability. 
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RISK AND STRICT LIABILITY: 
THE DISTINCT EXAMPLES OF GERMANY, THE US AND RUSSIA 
Gert Brüggemeier* 
 
Sociological risk research distinguishes between the concepts of danger and risk. Dangers are the 
natural events, which have always imperilled mankind: tempests, wild animals on land and sea, 
epidemics, earthquakes and tsunamis. By contrast, risks are man-made contingent perils, in particular 
in relation to industrial or technical development.1 The nineteenth Century industrial revolution2 
which began in Europe and the USA spread in different stages of development to the rest of the world 
and is now said to have led to another modernity – ‘risk society’ or ‘age of risk’.3 This development 
was of less influence on private law in general, especially contract law. For civil liability law, 
however, it was a clear watershed. 
This has long been ignored. There was a long tradition of the (personal) law of liability prior to the 
industrial revolution. This was the classic delictual/tortious liability for human wrongdoing – fault-
based liability. And there is an emerging bulk of (impersonal) law of liability after the industrial 
revolution. Its new paradigms are technical risks, enterprises and insurance. A societal mechanism of 
distribution of risks and losses is replacing the honourable culture of individual responsibility. The 
basis of this new risk pooling and liability channelling on risk taking enterprises is loss spreading by 
insurance – especially state social insurance and private third party (liability) insurance. Against this 
backdrop, “stricter” forms of liability came to the fore – quasi-strict enterprise liability and no fault-
liability.4 Both types of industrial liability for the first time showed up archetypically in the German 
Imperial Liability Act (Reichshaftpflichtgesetz – RHPflG) of 1871.5 
Notwithstanding these social upheavals civil law in general and law of delict in particular of the 
continental European codifications adhere to their pre-industrial moral heritage: namely, Roman law 
(iniuria/culpa) and natural law. In a similar way the law of torts of the Anglo-American Common Law 
remained pre-industrial until the 20th Century. The social consequences of the industrial revolution 
radiated only very gradually and in differing forms into the private law of all old industrial countries 
or were accommodated by functional equivalents, such as loss spreading through insurance schemes. 6 
                                                     
* Visiting Professor, European University Institute. Professor (em.) of Private Law and Comparative Law, Law Faculty, 
University of Bremen. 
1 N. Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos, 1991; id., Risk: A Sociological Theory, 1993 (tr. R. Barrett); D. Lupton, Risk, 1999; 
G. Bechmann (ed.), Risiko und Gesellschaft, 2d edn 1997; see also J. Steele, Risks and Legal Theory, 2004. 
2 Cf. as locus classicus  A. Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the 18th Century in England, 1884; see also H. 
Heaton, Industrial Revolution, in 8 Encyclopedia of Social Science 3 (1934). 
3  Cf. U. Beck, Risiko-Gesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, 19..; id., Risk Society, 1992 (tr. M. Ritter); J. 
Simon, The Emergence of a Risk Society: Insurance, Law and the State (1987) 95 Soc. L. Rev. 61. 
4  Especially on quasi-strict enterprise liability (comprising employers’ vicarious liability and liability of businesses for 
systemic fault with reversal of the burden of proof for „fault“) cf. Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht. Struktur, Prinzipien und 
Schutzbereich, 2006, pp. 117-184; id., Modernising Civil Liability Law in Europe, China, Brazil and Russia, 2011, pp. 
70. 
5 See below in the text. 
6 On Germany from an evolutionary economics point of view cf. M. Eckardt, Technischer Wandel und Rechtsevolution, 
2001, pp. 272; for the US: K.S. Abraham, The Liability Century, 2008; as comparative-historical accounts cf. J.M. 
Kleeberg, From Strict Liability to Workers Compensation, 36 Intern. Law & Politics 53 (2003); M. Martin-Casals (ed), 
Gert Brüggemeier 
2 
“Strict liability” was such a new element in private law. Until today, the concept of strict liability for 
risks and its contours have remained nebulous. This contribution undertakes a comparative-historical 
approximation having regard also to the cultural underpinnings of the three different legal responses to 
identical societal challenges presented here.7 
(Contd.)                                                                  
The Development of Liability in Relation to Technological Change, 2010 and W. Ernst (ed), The Development of 
Liability for Traffic, 2009. 
7 The insight that the perception of risk is a ‘cultural construct’ is another approach to understand these differences. Cf. M. 
Douglas/A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, 1982. 
Risk and Strict Liability 
3 
I. Germany – Risk Absorption through Social Insurance and Scattered 
Gefährdungshaftung 
The notion of strict liability in civil law8 commonly understood as liability without fault comprises 
very different elements:9 inter alia contractual warranty; successors to the Roman law actio ex 
recepto;10 no-fault liability of employers for delicts/torts of employees’;11 civil liability for sacrifice of 
assets;12 neighbour-liability for nuisance;13 traditional Roman law no-fault liability (wild animals, 
things that fall from buildings);14 liability for defective products;15 and strict liability for risks of 
technical plants and facilities, regardless of their defectiveness.16 Here, Gefährdungshaftung as one 
element of the class of strict liability is used exclusively in the latter context as liability for technical-
industrial risks. This Gefährdungshaftung is in its distinct German form the product of 
industrialisation: steam engines, mines, railways and other motorisation on ground, water and in the 
air.17 This new technical-industrial world with its industry- and transport-related accidents forced legal 
practitioners and legislatures to seek new regulatory strategies for dealing with these risks outside of 
the well-trodden paths of romanist-pandectist legal doctrine.18 
In Germany, the first answer to industrial accidents was Unternehmenshaftung (enterprise liability) 
pursuant to § 2 RHPflG 1871,19 before 1884 the great new alternative concept of compulsory state 
insurance for accidents at workplace (replacement of liability with the principle of loss spreading) 
                                                     
8 In the common law strict liability is used as an umbrella term to lump together anything from near-absolute liability to little 
more than a reversed burden of proof. Cf., inter alia, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 17th edn, 2006, at paras. 1-38. 
9 As stock-takings for the Germanic laws cf. R. Bienenfeld, Die Haftungen ohne Verschulden, 1933; L. Lenz, Haftung ohne 
Verschulden, 1975; as actual comparative studies cf. F. Werro/V.V. Palmer (eds), The Boundaries of Strict Liability in 
European Tort Law, 2004; B. Koch/H. Koziol (eds), Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability, 2002; and 
(monographically) G. Schamps, La mise en danger: un concept fondateur d’un principe général de responsabilité, 1998 
(albeit without German law). 
10 E.g. inn keepers’ liability in German law (§§ 701 BGB).   On the Roman law’s actio ex recepto  cf. M. Kaser, Römisches 
Privatrecht, vol. I, 2nd edn 1971, pp. 488; R. Ogorek, Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der Gefährdungshaftung im 19. 
Jahrhundert, 1975, pp. 81. 
11 Ship owners’ liability (§ 485 Commercial Code – Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB); § 3 (1) Inland Navigation Act - 
Binnenschiffahrtsgesetz); corporate liability for delicts of executives (§ 31 BGB). 
12 On this cf. Konzen, Aufopferung im Zivilrecht, 1969; Roth/Lemke/Krohn (ed.), Der bürgerlich-rechtliche 
Aufopferungsanspruch als Problem der Systemgerechtigkeit im Schadensersatzrecht, 2001.  
13 See (historically) A. Thier, Zwischen actio negatoria und Aufopferungsanspruch: Nachbarrechtliche Nutzungskonflikte in 
der Rechtsprechung des 19. Und 20. Jahrhunderts, in U. Falk/H. Mohnhaupt (eds), Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch und seine 
Richter (1896-1914), 2000, pp. 407; (actually) M. Wellenhofer, Verschuldensunabhängige Haftung im Nachbarrecht, in 
Gedächtnisschrift M. Wolf, 2011, pp. 323; (comparatively) J. Gordley (ed), The Development of Liability between 
Neighbours, CUP 2009.  
14 Liability for animals (actio de pauperie); liability for things thrown or falling from buildings (actio de deiectis vel effusis). 
Cf. Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht I, pp. 163, 610.  
15 For the EU see Directive (85/374 EEC) on liability for defective Products, OJ L 210/19 of 7.8.1985; from a comparative 
historical point of view cf. S. Whittaker (ed), The Development of Product Liability, 2010. 
16 Cf. the account of F. Dietz, Technische Risiken und Gefährdungshaftung, 2006, pp. 42-147. 
17 Cf., inter alia, F.W. Henning, Die Industrialisierung in Deutschland 1800 bis 1918, 1993. 
18 On this, cf. Eckardt, Technischer Wandel, pp. 205. See also L. von Stein, Zur Eisenbahnrechtsbildung, 1872, at 15: 
“Germany is sheerly unexhausted of treatises on Ulpian and Papinian, however the law of railways is completely 
unknown.” 
19 See more on this below in the text. 
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came into force, a model which continental European states adopted successively.20 The German 
answer to the “age of railways” was a sort of strict civil liability (1838/1871)21, out of which the 
modern Gefährdungshaftung22 developed. The form in which this liability answer was presented, was 
that of narrow special legislation. This relationship of rule and exception was underscored by the BGB 
legislator, when it insisted not to overload the BGB and its personal fault liability (subject paradigm) 
with special provisions of stricter liability.23 Still today, this bias determines the relationship between 
the law of delict and Gefährdungshaftung. There followed incrementally with nearly each particular 
technological innovation a new special regulation:24 Railway, automobile, aircraft, energy 
installations, atomic energy, liability of industrial undertakings for environmental damage,25 and 
genetic technology26. Strict liability of the manufacturer for defective products takes a special place 
internationally, between quasi-strict enterprise liability and Gefährdungshaftung. Nothing further is 
said on that theme here.27 
This Gefährdungshaftung of commercial risk takers has in the Germanic legal discourse been 
consistently justified with three arguments. 1. Social progress by technological innovations with their 
contingent potentiality of risk may only be bought at the price of a “guarantee liability” of the risk-
taker. 2. Risk-taking enterprises can distribute the losses caused by risk exposure to others by 
spreading (insurance, prices, salaries); and 3. Enterprises can minimise risk through control and safety 
precautions. 28  
                                                     
20 Inter alia France 1898.  Also the common law jurisdictions of England and the USA pursued the path of special legislation, 
at least as far as accidents in the workplace were concerned: Workers’ Compensation Acts/Statutes (strict employers’ 
liability with compulsatory liability insurance; abolition of the tort system): England 1897 (shifting in 1947 to a National 
insurance system); and - with some delay - USA 1910-1920. On the US see more below in the text.  
21 To be more precise, it was a peculiar liability regime of unrebuttable presumption of fault (of the railway company or of its 
employees). For more detail on this subject see Brüggemeier, Verschuldenshaftung, Unternehmenshaftung, 
Gefährdungshaftung, in Festschrift H. Rüßmann, 2013, pp. 265. 
22 The concept of Gefährdungshaftung (as strict liability for technical risks) was thoroughly unknown to the legal academia 
and to law practitioners during the 19th century. Things changed around the turn of the 20th century when in France strict 
liability for the ‘acts of things’ (responsabilité des guardiens des choses – Art. 1384 (1) C. civ) gained acceptance. 
23 Protokolle vol. II, at p. 2785. See also Art. 105 EGBGB (Introductory Act to the BGB) 1896.  
24 Cf. F. Dietz, Technische Risiken und Gefährdungshaftung, 2006. 
25 Water Ressources Management Act/Wasserhaushaltsgesetz of 1957; Environmental Liability Act/Umwelthaftungsgesetz 
of 1990. 
26 Act on Genetic Engineering/Gentechnikgesetz of 2008. 
27 Cf. S. Whittaker, Development of Product Liability, 2010. The correct understanding is that products liability for 
manufacturing defects (“flaws”) is strict, whereas for design and warning defects it is negligence liability. Cf. also fn 129. 
28 From V. Mataja, Das Recht des Schadensersatzes vom Standpunkt der Nationalökonomie, 1888 to the travaux préparatoirs 
of the Draft Bill on Amending the Law of Damages of 19.12.1975, Bundesrats-Drucksache 777/75, at p. 7: “Leading to a 
stricter liability is the thought that under the given circumstances, determined by the technical industrial development, 
certain activities and facilities are indispensable and therefor must be tolerated. This is true notwithstanding their inherent 
risks which cannot be completely controlled so that injuries to third parties cannotbe avoided even with useof utmost 
care. Who with knowledge of these risks exposes others to theses risks must be prepared to compensate the resulting 
damage regardless whether evidence for fault can be brought in the concrete case. It is appropriate to let the entrepreneur 
of such risky activies bear the loss because he is in the position to control the risks and to spread the respective losses, 
especially by liability insurance.” 
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1. The Railway 
a) § 25 Prussian Railway Act of 1838 
The railway was developed in England. The ‘age of the railway’ began at the latest in 1830 as the first 
steam locomotives came into regular use between Liverpool and Manchester.29 Railway liability law 
however had its origin in 1838 in Prussia, in what was then a principally agrarian state, in which there 
was at the time only one 34 km long stretch of railway between Berlin and Potsdam. There, in 1838, a 
railway Statute came into force, which regulated the conditions for the state licencing of private 
railway companies.30 The Statute also contained a provision on liability (§ 25): 
 
The [railway] company is liable for all damage incurred by persons and goods during 
transportation by rail and by other persons and their goods, and it may only exonerate itself from 
such liability by proving that the damage arose from the personal fault of the injured person or 
through unavoidable external factors. The risky nature of railways per se shall not constitute one 
such factor. 31 
 
§ 25 of the Railway Act combines traditional and modern elements. The Prussian minister of 
administration originally intended to establish a liability of railway companies  based on a 
presumption of fault. The slightly distinct final liability rule was particularly influenced by a written 
opinion F.C. von Savigny had been asked to deliver to the Prussian State Council.32 For the Romanist 
Savigny the quasi-contractual guarantee liability of the actio ex recepto seemed to have served as a 
blueprint. According to this, nautical carriers (nautae), innkeepers (caupones), and stables (stabularii) 
were liable independent of fault for the goods brought by guests onto their premises.33 This liability 
could be avoided only in instances of acts of God.  
This element of receptum liability came again to the fore when the focus was on ‘transportation by 
rail’. The primary goal of § 25 was the protection of the integrity of transported persons and goods. 
The scope of protection was extended to other persons and their things. What was intended by this 
expression remained unclear. This concerned first the victims of accidents related to the railways, for 
example in the context of railway crossings. Savigny took the view that the protection should also 
encompass injury caused during the normal use of ‘risky’ railways, in particular, the damage to 
neighbouring land through vibrations or sparks. This aimed at the protection of the interests of the 
Prussian landed gentry. Whilst this approach was restrictively interpreted in the case-law,34 courts 
have instead extended the area of application of § 25 to railway personnel.35 Railway employees were 
                                                     
29 The world’s first modern railway is said to be the Stockton and Darlington Railway, opened in 1825 in Yorkshire, 
England. The first German railway (with an English locomotive) operated in 1835 between Nuremberg and Fürth. 
30 On this cf. W. Schubert, Das preußische Eisenbahngesetz von 1838, Journal of Legal History (ZRG), Germanic dep. (GA), 
(1999) 116, 152 .  
31 § 25 Gesetz über die Eisenbahn-Unternehmungen (Act on Railway Companies), Prussian Gazette 1838, 505, at 510 
(emphases added – G.B.) 
32 Cf. T. Baums, Die Einführung der Gefährdungshaftung, Journal of Legal History (ZRG), Roman. Dep. (RA), (1987) 104, 
277 and generally Lenz, Haftung ohne Verschulden, pp. 57. 
33 On this see Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht, vol. I, pp. 84-86; Ogorek, Untersuchungen, pp. 81. There are similarities to 
the common law’s no-fault liability of common carriers. See also below in the text. 
34 For references see Kleeberg, 36 Intern. Law & Politics 53, 74 ff. (2003). The courts excluded in cases of expropriation 
procedures or of contractual relations between railway and land owner the respective damages claims of land owners. 
This can be interpreted as an early variant of the Coase-theorem. Cf. R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
Econ, 1, 29 et seq. (1960). 
35 Kleeberg, 36 Intern. Law & Politics, 53, 78 et seq. (2003). 
Gert Brüggemeier 
6 
during the regulatory process, if mentioned at all, without exception regarded as potential wrongdoers 
whose fault had to be imputed to the company. By this case law, contrary to the intention of the 
legislator, accidents of railway employees ‘during transportation’ led to damages claims.  
The liability of the railway company was excluded in cases of contributory negligence36 and 
unavoidable external factors. A step towards modern Gefährdungshaftung is the clarification that the 
inherent risks of the railway are not in themselves excluding factors.37 The central weakness of § 25 
PrEBG is again related to its roots in receptum liability. § 25 was of mere dispositive effect and was 
thereby subject to contractual waiver.38 Regular use was made of this disposability in the contracts of 
carriage with passengers and (after the judicial extension to accidents at work) in the employment 
contracts of railway personnel. The rapid extension of the railway network in Prussia was not however 
hindered by this legal regime.39 
Other states within and without the German Confederation (1818-66), in particular Austria40 and 
Switzerland,41 adopted this approach to liability. Where this was not the case, the courts came to 
conclusions which were comparable to findings of no-fault liability, using fictitious constructs.42 The 
Judgment of the Superior Appellate Court of Munich dated 14th June 1861 has achieved some fame: 
the regular operation of a railway was considered a “cupable activity”, which made the railway 
responsible under fault liability for damage to property caused by the escape of sparks.43 Outside of 
Prussia, i.e. the area of application of § 25 PrEBG, recourse was also had to the concept of civil 
compensation for sacrifice of assets (Aufopferung)44 – a comparable oscillation between overstretching 
fault liability (especially in France) and tending towards no-fault compensation under property law 
characterise the legal development in the other European industrial states.45 
 
                                                     
36 It was due to the culpa compensatio doctrine of the Ius Commune of those days. This corresponded to the doctrine of 
contributory negligence of 19th century common law. 
37 At second glance however it turned out, that the “risk” was by no means restricted to the new steam locomotives, instead 
also horse drawn vehicles were subsumed by the courts under § 25 PrEBG.  
38 Waiver was no longer at the disposition of the parties, as far as transportation contracts are concerned, by the General 
German Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch – Art. 423 ADHGB) of 1861 – and with respect 
to “other persons and goods”, i.e. especially employment contracts of the railway personnel, by a Supplementary Act to 
the Prussian Railway Act of 3.5.1869 (Pruss. Gaz. 1869, 665); supposedly inspired by § 2 (2) Austrian Railway Liability 
Act of 5.3.1869 (cf. fn. 41). 
39 For figures cf. Scherpe, Germany, in Martin-Casals (ed), Liability in Relation to Technological Change, 134, at 149-55. 
40 Gesetz betr. die Haftung der Eisenbahn-Unternehmungen für die durch Ereignungen auf Eisenbahnen herbeigeführten 
körperlichen Verletzungen oder Tödtungen von Menschen of 5.3.1869 (Austrian RGBl. at p. 109). 
41 Schweizerisches Eisenbahn-Haftpflichtgesetz of 1.7.1875, encompassing also inland shipping and funiculars. 
42 For further references cf. Scherpe, in Martin-Casals, Liability in Relation to Technological Change, 134, at 144-46. 
43 Seuffert’s Archive 14 (1861), 354, 358: The operation of a railway entails “necessarily and inherently a culpable 
behaviour”. For comments on this cf., inter alia, S. Meder, Schuld, Zufall, Risiko, 1993, pp. 232. A clear opposite opinion 
was then decided by the Imperial Court (Reichsgericht - RG), 7.12.1886, RGZ 17, 103: actio negatoria under Ius 
Commune. 
44 RG, 11.5.1904, RGZ 58, 130; 21.12.1908 RGZ 70, 150. When the BGB came into force 1.1.1900 in the German Empire 
(1871-1918), the matter was treated with a balancing of neighbours’ interests under property law (§ 906 (2) sen. 2 BGB. 
Cf. Thier, Zwischen actio negatoria und Aufopferungsanspruch, in Falk/Mohnhaupt, Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch und 
seine Richter, pp. 407. 
45 A comparative account of the damage-by-sparks cases can be found in Martin-Casals (ed), Liability in Relation to 
Technological Change, 2010 (covering England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain). 
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b) § 1 Imperial Liability Act (Reichshaftplichtgesetz – RHPflG) of 1871 
§ 1 RHPflG of 1871 adopted the same basic approach as § 25 PrEGB and transposed it into a railway 
liability law for the entire territory of the new German Empire. Its rationale remained ambivalent. The 
preparatory materials (Motive) explicitly speak of presumed fault, although this notion, as 
distinguished from the Austrian Act of 1869, does not show up in the official text.46  
 
If in the operation of a railway a person is killed or injured, the railway company is liable for the 
resulting damage unless it can prove that the accident was caused by either an act of God or the 
fault of the killed or injured person. 47 
 
§ 1 RHPflG determines in a precise way the basis of liability, the scope of protection and the 
exceptions to liability. Instead of treating near-contractual transportation, the focus is now on the 
technical operation. However  the damage caused by regular operation does not lead to damages but 
instead injuries incurred by accidents in the operation of a railway do. The scope of protection of this 
liability is restricted to persons,48 namely the killing and injury of transported persons, of railway 
personnel and third parties.  Damage to property is, as distinct from Prussian law, no longer included, 
without any explanation being given for this in the preparatory materials.49 Transported goods were 
covered by carriage contracts. In spite of its focus on injury to persons, there is no mention of 
compensation for pain and suffering neither in the text of the RHPflG nor in the preparatory materials. 
Although foreign to Roman law, pain and suffering awards were recognised in Germanic law and 
spread throughout the case law of 19th Century’s ius commune.50 In addition moral damages were also 
included in Austrian railway liability law.51 Importantly, railways’ liability under the RHPflG, this 
time in accordance with the Austrian model, is in the form of binding law and thereby no longer to the 
disposition of contractual parties. Finally, the Act of 1871 does not provide for a ceiling to railway 
companies’ liability.  Liability caps were generally unknown in the laws of those days. 
In respect of exclusion of liability, on the one hand, it rested on acts of god, which replaced the notion 
of the unavoidable external factor. On the other hand, liability remained excluded in case of 
contributory negligence of the injured person. That changed after the coming into force of the BGB on 
1st January 1900. Thereafter, a regime of comparative negligence applied with a proportional 
reduction of the amount of damages instead of forfeiture (§ 254 BGB).52 As far as economic damages 
are concerned, otherwise than under the PrEG, consequential damages (lost profit, annuity payments 
for dependents) were recoverable. 
                                                     
46 Reichstags-Drucksachen 1871, Suppl. Vol. no. 16, p. 70. The formula of an “always presumed fault” is to be found 
explicitly in § 1 Austrian Railway Liability Act of 1869 (cf. fn 41). 
47 § 1 Reichshaftpflichtgesetz of 7.6.1871, RGBl. 1871, 207. 
48 A nation-wide extension of railway liability to damage to property occurred with the Sachschadenhaftpflichtgesetz (Act on 
Liability for Property Damage) of 1940, RGBl. 1940 I, 691. This implied the final  abolition of § 25 PrEG. 
49 The unspoken reason for this restriction may be the overarching target of the Reichshaftpflichtgesetz: i.e. providing 
compensation for physical injuries by industrial accidents. See on this below in the text. 
50 For references cf. Ogorek, Untersuchungen, pp. 65/66. 
51 § 1 EBHG, § 1325 ABGB. The reason for this reference to the general law of damages (§§ 1293-1341 ABGB) in the 
Austrian railway law may be the explicit understanding of this type of liability as one for presumed fault (of the railway 
company or the railway personnel). As displayed above, the same was true for the German law. 
52 RG, 24.11.1902, RGZ 53, 75. The opposite old law remained in force with regard to the liability for property damage 
under § 25 PrEG (in force in Prussia till 1940. Cf. fn. 49): RG, 3.5.1906, RGZ 63, 270. 
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2. Industrial Labour Accidents 
The Reichshaftpflichtgesetz attempted also a legal solution of the most virulent social problem of 
ongoing industrialisation –  accidents in the workplace. An extension of the no-fault type of railway 
liability to other risky industries was promoted in the then socio-political discussions about a private 
law contribution to the problem of industrial accidents. This initiative floundered against resistance 
from heavy industry.53 Instead, the result was a direct liability of an enumerated class of risky 
enterprises for the fault of executives and other enterprise representatives (§ 2 RHPflG). This singular 
statutory rule of enterprise liability for mere fault of representatives is a concealed forerunner to the 
modern liability of organisations for systemic fault.54 Plainly, it is to be distinguished from the classic 
cases of employers’ liability for employees’ torts (§ 831 BGB/Art. 1384 (3) C. civ./vicarious liability) 
or the corporate liability for executives’ delicts (§ 31 BGB), which in principle lead to joint and 
several liability. Here, the liability is channelled exclusively on the enterprise. Although this provision 
of law is still in force today, it has achieved no practical significance.55 The problem of industrial 
accidents remained - even after 1871 – socio-politically and legally contentious.56 In 1884, this issue 
was resolved in an entirely different way, instead of damage compensation through private liability 
law the principle of distribution of loss was used, by way of introducing a compulsory state insurance 
scheme for accidents at workplace.57 Through their burden of financing the claims, there were 
economic incentives on employers to invest in accident avoidance. This social insurance scheme has 
been extended in the 20th Century to accidents ‘on the job’ and at public schools generally, and also 
includes accidents during the transport to and from work or school. 
3. Third Party (Liability) Insurance 
Both of the two new grounds for liability under Reichshaftpflichtgesetz 1871, the nation-wide no-fault 
liability of the railway companies under § 1 and the liability of industrial enterprises under § 2 had the 
further effect that they contributed significantly to the emergence of an independent new branch of 
private insurance industry in Germany – liability or third party insurance. The availability of liability 
insurance with its concomitant possibility of risk and loss distribution in turn served to have the 
reverse effect in fostering the further spread of stricter forms of liability: The chance to externalise the 
risks of business activities on insurers made it more sensible for the courts to internalise the losses 
caused by these activities as costs on the risk creating enterprises. 
4. Automobiles and Aircraft 
Towards the end of the 19th Century, the railway was complimented by further revolutions in 
transport technique: steamship, automobile and airplane. German no-fault liability law was extended 
to cover automobiles and aircrafts. Steamships have been spared to date (in contrast e.g. to Switzerland 
and Russia58). 59  
                                                     
53 Cf. Ogorek, Untersuchungen, pp. 98; Eckardt, Technischer Wandel, pp. 261. 
54 On organisations’/enterprises’ liability for systemic fault cf. references in fn. 4 
55  On § 3 Haftpflichtgesetz 1978 (= § 2 RHPflG 1871) cf. W. Filthaut, Commentary on the Haftpflichtgesetz, 2009: 
“practical relevance is small” (§ 3 para. 2). 
56  On the interdisciplinary proceedings in the ‚Verein für Socialpolitik’, founded 1873, cf. Die Haftpflichtfrage, Schriften 
des Vereins für Socialpolitik, vol. 19, 1880. 
57  Eckardt, Technischer Wandel, pp. 272. One year before, in 1873, a workers’ health insurance has been established. On 
this in general cf. M. Stolleis, Geschichte des Sozialrechts in Deutschland, 2002. 
58 On Russia see below in the text. 
59 The preparatory materials (Motive) of the Reichshaftpflichtgesetz brought as an argument for this sparing out, that the 
respective cases of steam ships were covered by the liability of ship owners under Art. 451 ADHGB. Cf. Reichstag-
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a) The Automobile 
The vehicle with combustion engine (automobile) was invented in Germany (C. Benz 1886); the first 
boom the automobile experienced was however in France. In Germany, at the first official count in 
1907, there were 10000 personal cars and 15000 motorcycles registered. 60 In 1909 the Act on 
Automobile Traffic (Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen – KFG) came into force, which 
contained a relatively detailed section on the liability of car operators.61 § 7 read: 
 
If in the operation of an automobile a person is killed, his body or health injured or property 
damaged, the operator of the automobile is obliged to compensate the resulting damage. 
 
This provision marks the very beginning of modern Gefährungshaftung. The eggshells of receptum 
liability and of quasi-contractual carriage as well as any presumption of fault are thrown away. The 
target of the law was the taming of the risks of automobile traffic. In contrast to railway liability laws 
therefore, these norms concentrated exclusively on the protection of other persons outside the motor 
vehicle, in particular, pedestrians. Liability was triggered where a person was killed or injured, or if 
property was damaged “in the operation of a car”. The passengers62 and the employees of a 
commercial car operator were left out. The latter fell under the coverage of industrial accident 
insurance, the former under contract law. The addressee of this strict liability was the owner or 
operator of the automobile. Any authorised driver, non-identical with the operator, was only liable for 
fault, which in case of accident was presumed. In the second half of the 20th Century, the liability 
aegis was progressively widened to cover passengers who (paid or unpaid) were transported by 
automobiles.63  
Instead of force majeure or act of God, the ‘inevitable event’64 constituted an exclusionary ground. It 
took nearly 100 years until there was in 2002 a return to the exclusionary ground of the force majeure 
(known already from § 1 RHPflG).65 § 12 KFG contained for the first time ceilings to liability. These 
served to check the increasing premiums of liability insurance so as to ensure their affordability. In 
1939, following the Scandinavian and English model,  compulsory liability insurance for car owners 
was introduced. The aim of liability insurance is so far primarily at ensuring the financial security of 
the policy holder, with compulsory insurance as the guarantee that compensation of the victim came to 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Drucksache (fn 48), p. 70 (left col.). Art. 451 ADHGB (= § 485 HGB) however provides only for a no-fault liability of 
ship owners for delicts/torts of employees (i.e. vicarious liability). 
60 Verband der Automobilindustrie (ed), Tatsachen und Zahlen aus der Kraftverkehrswirtschaft 1969/70, 1970, p. 207. 
61 RGBl. 1909, 437: §§ 7-20; see on this W. Schubert, Das Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen vom 3.5.1909 
(2000) 117 ZRG (Germ. Dep.) 238; H. Ritschl, Vom Verkehrschaos zur Verkehrsordnung, 1968. 
62 In the American law of negligence a similar result of reduction of drivers’ liability towards passengers was effectuated 
through the so-called Guest-Statutes. They were enacted in the late 1920s. The car operator was liable only for gross 
negligence. Most of these Statutes ceased to be in force. 
63 Since 1939: paid transport by public carriers (§ 8 (2) KFG); since 1957: generally paid transport (former § 8a StVG); since 
2002: also unpaid transport of persons (§ 8a StVG). 
64 § 7 (2) sent. 2 KFG: “An event is in particular regarded as inevitable when it is caused by the conduct of the injured or of a 
third party not employed by the car operator or by an animal and the operator as well as the driver paid highest due care 
under the given circumstances.”  
65 The astonishing reason brought forward after nearly 100 years of validity of § 7 (2) KFG was that an exclusion of liability 
due to an inevitable event was inappropriate and a foreign element in the German law of Gefährdungshaftung. 
Bundestag-Drucksache 14/7752 of 7.12.2001, at p. 30. 
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the fore.66 Far from harmonising the law of road traffic liability itself, the EU in the meantime has 
thoroughly unified this law of automobile liability insurance.67 
b) The Airplane 
In 1908 the age of airplanes began (flight of the Wright brothers in England/journey of Zeppelin’s 
blimp in Germany). Already in 1922 the German legislator passed an Act on Air Traffic (Gesetz über 
den Luftverkehr – LVG). 68 § 19 read: 
 
If in the operation of an aircraft by an accident a person is killed, his/her body or health injured or 
property damaged, the operator of the aircraft is obliged to compensate the damage. 
 
The regulatory approach is in line with automobile liability. Liability caps are contained; compulsory 
liability insurance provided for. No exclusionary ground was introduced. Although causation ‘by an 
accident’ was explicitly incorporated in the text of the law, the judiciary went further by extending the 
umbrella of protection of § 19 LuftVG so as to include damage to persons and property on the ground 
caused e.g. by low flying aircrafts. 69 
As far as the international carriage of passengers and cargo by air is concerned this national law was 
soon replaced by international conventions. In 1929 the Warsaw Convention (WC) was passed.70 It 
originally provided for a regime of quasi-strict liability of air carriers (i.e. presumption of fault).71 This 
was a compromise between the strict liability of  French contract law (‘obligation de résultat’) and the 
strict law of other continental European countries like Germany on the one side and the respect for the 
supposed needs of the developing aviation industry on the other side. The liability was limited by 
fixed amounts for death or personal injury of the passengers.72 Although Art. 17 WC also focused on 
an ‘accident’, its interpretation has been stretched by courts from the materialisation of technical risks 
to man-made incidents (including terrorist acts or sexual assaults by co-passengers).73 Its successor, 
the Montreal Convention of 1999 (MC),74 was less a newly conceived legal document but more a 
                                                     
66 Act on the Introduction of Compulsory Insurance for Operators of Motor Vehicles, RGBl 1939 I, pp. 2223. Cf. R. 
Dubischar, Die Kfz-Pflichtversicherung und ihre Wandlungen, in Hadding (ed), Festschrift Zivilrechtslehrer 1934/1935, 
1999, pp. 59. 
67 See now the Consolidated Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, and the enforcement of obligation to insure against such liability,OJ L 263/11 of 7.10.2009. Cf. in this context 
H. Heiss, Liability Insurance, in R. Schulze (ed), Compensation of Private Losses, 2011, pp. 213.        
68 RGBl. 1922 I, p. 681. 
69 RG, 4.7.1938, RGZ 158, 34 (silver foxes); Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), 27.1.1981, BGHZ 79, 29 (helicopter); BGH, 
1.12.1981, VersR 1982, 243.  
70 [Warsaw] Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air of 12 Oct. 1929 
(amended at The Hague on 28 Sept. 1955 and by Protocol No. 4 of Montreal 1975). 
71 Art. 17. The air carrier could rebut the presumption by showing that it has taken ‘all necessary measures’ to avoid the 
damage (Art. 20).  This liability regime of Arts. 17, 20 WC comes close to the strict liability under 7 (1) (2) KFG 1909. 
Cf. above in the text. 
72 Art. 22. Liability was unlimited if the passenger (or his/her relative) could prove that the accident was caused by 
intentional or reckless behaviour of the carrier’s personnel (Art. 25).  
73 As landmark case cf. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); on this in general (albeit exclusively from an Anglo-
American law perspective) see G. Leloudas, Risk and Liability in Air Law, 2009.  
74 [Montreal] Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air of 28 May 1999. 103 
of the 191 International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Member States have ratified the Convention (as of Aug. 
2012). 
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consolidation of the WC and its amendments hitherto into a single treaty. MC established a two tiered 
system of responsibility of air carriers (Arts. 17/21): 1) Strict liability up to an amount of 113 100 
SDR75 for each killed or injured passenger. Force majeure and acts of god are not recognised as 
exclusionary grounds. 2) Unlimited quasi-strict liability for exceeding extents of damages. The carrier 
can exonerate itself from this liability by showing evidence that (i) the damage was not due to its fault 
or that (ii) it was solely caused by the fault of a third party. The principles of comparative 
fault/negligence apply in both cases. Any damages claim of a passenger falling under the ambit of this 
Convention is bound to its rules and limits.76 (The crew members are under their respective national 
social insurance or workmen compensation schemes.) By EU law this liability regime has been 
extended to all carriages effectuated by EU or EEA77 air carriers regardless whether it is a domestic, 
inner-union or international flight.78  
Many steps have been undertaken to work out an international convention on air carriers’ liability for 
damage to third parties79 on the ground (Rome Convention). These drafting works have not yet come 
to a final result.80 This scenario remains so far under the respective national law; as does the 
responsibility for accidents caused by military aviation leading to governmental liability. 
5. Characterisation 
The German model to tackle the emerging new risks of industrialisation developed out of an 
authoritarian-welfare-state’s proneness to preventive risk regulation. This model had two tracks: state 
social insurance and ‘stricter’ forms of civil liability (enterprise liability and Gefährdungshaftung) 
beyond the fault principle. The first was in the Bismarck era not to be separated from the political 
context of the attempted state domestication of the new class of industrial workers and their 
organisations (socialist parties; trade unions) and their integration into the society of imperial 
Germany. The special legislation on no-fault liability came from politics, too. The different heads of 
liability for technical risks developed before and after 1900 in the shadow of the great systematic 
codification of the BGB. This lay in the hands of pandectist academics and practitioners. The BGB was 
conceived as ‘the’ liberal constitution of the Empire (party autonomy/freedom of 
contract/fault/property). Political attempts to incorporate strict liability provisions into the BGB 
failed.81 The statutory norms of no-fault liability notwithstanding their individual differences came 
about as ad hoc pragmatic technical exceptions from the prevailing fault principle, which were to be 
interpreted narrowly; further, no analogy was available.82 This exceptionality, disparate aegis83 and 
                                                     
75 Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund (= $ 175 800 as of Dec. 2011). 
76 Exclusionary rule of Art. 29 MC. Cf. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Sidhu v British Airlines 
[1997] A.C. 430 (HL), both on Art. 24 Warsaw Convention. 
77 European Economic Area (comprising Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). 
78 Cf. Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 of the EU Parliament and Council of 13 May 2002 on air carrier liability in the event of 
accidents, OJ L 140/2 of 30.5.2002 (amending Council Reg. (EC) No 2027/97). 
79 ‘Accidents’ to passengers when embarking or disembarking are covered by the Conventions. 
80 On the drafting processes of the Rome Convention see Leloudas, Risk and Liability, pp. 153. 
81 For more details on this neglected subject of legal history see Lenz, Haftung ohne Verschulden, pp. 263-275. 
82 RG, 11.1.1912, RGZ 78, 171 (no extension of railway liability on aircrafts). An analogy with strict liability provisions was 
however practiced in Austria. Cf. H. Koziol, Umfassende Gefährdungshaftung durch Analogie?, in Festschrift Wilburg, 
1975, pp. 173. 
83 Mainly uncertainty about the ‘ground of liability’: accident or plain materialisation of a characteristic risk or just every 
event correlated with the risky activity. In addition: different scope of protection: from the limitation to personal injury to 
the extension to property damage to the occasional coverage pure economic loss; different exclusionary grounds: from 
the act of God to the inevitable event back to force majeure; some heads of Gefährdungshaftung even being without any 
exclusionary grounds. Different regulations concerning liability caps and compulsory insurance. 
Gert Brüggemeier 
12 
distance to the ‘grand idea of private law’84 have until today hindered the development of a scientific 
doctrine of Gefährdungshaftung, which could give political orientation to coherent legislation. 
Academic  initiatives aiming at a fundamental overhaul, that is the unification of the individual 
headings plus a general clause of Gefährdungshaftung85 or the complete replacement of the disparate 
provisions on Gefährdungshaftung with a unifying general clause86 have to date failed. 87 
Mutatis mutandis the same is true for enterprise liability. It started as an unsuccessful, nearly forgotten 
statutory rule (§ 2 RHPflG) and became then after the turn of the 20th Century the subject of judge 
made law.88 The courts tried to pave a way for organisational responsibility filling the gap in the 
BGB’s law of delict between the employers’ vicarious liability for presumed own fault (§ 831) and the 
law of individual fault liability (§ 823 (1) et seq.). Not recognised by the individualistic Romanist 
BGB, enterprise liability is – like Gefährdungshaftung - still struggling to lose its label as illegitimate 
child of private law. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Moral damages (pain and suffering) remained first precluded, whereas they were always available in the case of the strict 
liability of animal keepers and in the air liability law for military aircraft and later on in the nuclear law. Moral damage is 
still generally not recoverable under Gefährdungshaftung in Swiss law. In Austria, after its absorption into Nazi-Germany 
1938, the German non-compensation-of-moral-damage-rule came in force, but was then dismissed again in 1959. In 
Germany a general recoverability came about but in 2002.  
84 Elegantly presented by E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, 1995. 
85 This path has been pursued by the Chinese legislator when codifying the law of delict in 2010 (Arts. 70-74). Cf., inter alia, 
Brüggemeier, Modernising Civil Liability Law, pp. 194. 
86 This solution can be found in the Russian (see below) and the Brazilian Civil Code. 
87 On the reform discussion in Germany see, inter alia, E. Deutsch, Generalklausel für Gefährdungshaftung, Karlsruher 
Forum 1968; H. Kötz, Haftung für besondere Gefahr – Generalklausel für Gefährdungshaftung, AcP 170 (1970), 1; E. v. 
Caemmerer, Reform der Gefährdungshaftung, 1971; Kötz, Gefährdungshaftung, in: Federal Minister of Justice (ed.), 
Gutachten und Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, vol. II, 1981, pp. 1779 with further references. 
88 Cf. RG, 25.2.1915, RGZ 87, 1; BGH, 26.11.1968, BGHZ 51, 91; BGH, 18.9.1984, BGHZ 92, 143. For more detail on this 
subject see Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht, pp. 127. 
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II. USA: Negligence-Centred Torts System and Ousted Strict Liability 
The common law of the United States like English common law in the first place recognised manifest 
personal civil wrongs (torts). A large part comprises intentional injurious behaviour, for example 
trespass. In the 19th Century, the new all-encompassing tort of negligence emerged. It soon became 
the unifying principle of American tort law. It also stood in the centre of the social management of the 
liability law consequences of the industrial revolution. The post-civil war and post-depression period 
to the close of the 19th Century is characterized by the emergence of big firms, the development of 
liability insurance, and culminated then in the constitutional disputes and political discussions about 
the replacement of the traditional torts system in parts through alternatives like the (no-fault) workers 
compensation legislation of the early part of the 20th Century. 89  
At that point, the USA was already the leading industrial nation of the world, but also the nation with 
the highest incidence of industrial accidents (certainly by comparison with comparable industrial 
nations like England and Germany).90 
1. Industrial Accidents 
If in continental Europe natural law and enlightenment philosophy were the basis for the eminence of 
the subject-paradigm in private law, simply superimposed with doctrines of economic liberalism, it 
was the other way around in the USA. Here, economic liberalism, the ideology of free 
entrepreneurship and individual responsibility determined the discussion in law and politics up until 
the 20th Century.  
The legal situation of the victims of accidents at work in the second half of the 19th Century was 
judged by common law.91 The business-employer was liable to the injured worker under the tort of 
negligence only in cases of carelessness, which was, as a rule, not provable. Additionally, the 
enterprise-employer could even in cases of its fault (i.e. fault of its executives), rely upon the worker’s 
voluntary assumption of risk. The worker was treated as if he had accepted the risks of injury in 
employment by the formation of his contract as it was. 92 If the worker came to injury through the fault 
of a fellow worker, the employer might be vicariously liable. This doctrine of vicarious liability 
rendered the business-employer liable without personal fault for the torts of its employees. It is a strict 
liability of businesses for the wrongful acts of their employees committed within the scope of their 
employment. Here, however, the fellow servant rule stood in its way.93 Pursuant to this rule, the 
employer was not liable for damage done by an employee to another employee during his 
employment.94 Frequently, also contributory negligence95 affected the victim’s claim. Already slight 
contributory fault of the victim led – like in the contemporary German ius commune – to a complete 
forfeiture of liability. The ‘unholy alliance’ of these three common law defences (assumption of risk, 
                                                     
89 Generally on this time of so-called Gilded Age cf. L.M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3d edn. 2005, Part III, ch. 
1: “Blood and Gold”. 
90 For references cf. Kleeberg, 36 Intern. Law & Politics, 53, 116-123 (2003) and Friedman, History of American Law, 2005, 
p. 362. 
91 As locus clasicus cf. O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, 1881. 
92 This complied with the liberal principles of contract law only in cases where the worker had been payed out with 
additional money for this assumption of risk. This did regularly not happen. 
93 In England: Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mees & Wels 1 (1837); in USA: Farwell v. Boston & Worcester RR Corp., 45 Mass. (4 
Met.) 49 (1842). 
94 Instead the victim had to sue the fellow worker. 
95 Cf. W.S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151 (1946). 
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fellow servant and contributory negligence) had the bitter consequences that the victims of industrial 
accidents and their (surviving) dependents had to shoulder the financial burden of the accident alone, 
which often catapulted them into abject poverty.96  
This complete failure of the common law of torts in the field of industrial accidents eventually spurred 
the legislature into action. Until the end of the 19th Century, individual states enacted so-called 
Employers’ Liability Acts. They were in their content and scope thoroughly varied. They did by no 
means abolish the negligence system. The limited common aim of these Acts was simply to make the 
common law defensive bulwark against the damages actions of victims of industrial accidents more 
permeable. It is noteworthy that the courts in the USA, contrary to the approach in England and 
Prussia, ruled out contractual waivers of these limitations of liability.97  
In 1910, 23 states and the federal government had passed Empoyers’ Liability Acts. The Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) originated in 1906 and was limited to the interstate railway transport. 
It eliminated the fellow servant rule, replaced contributory with comparative negligence98 and 
abolished assumption of risk, to the extent that the railway company had acted in violation of legal 
provisions. Tellingly, FELA 190699 was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court, before 
an amended version in 1911 passed the constitutionality test. 100   
If the Employers’ Liability Acts trimmed the fringes of the common law of torts, the Workmen 
Compensation Statutes entered uncharted territory.101 Between 1910102 and 1920, they were 
introduced in 43 states and rolled out a private law variant of the Bismarckian industrial accidents 
insurance. Workmen compensation statutes were characterised by three elements: 1. Abolition of the 
traditional negligence liability in tort; 2. Strict liability of the employer, save for intentional self-harm 
by the employee; 3. Swift but limited compensatory payments in the case of injury and death. In 
particular compensation for pain and suffering is excluded.   
The businesses were under an obligation to take out special workmen compensation insurance, unless 
the firm was allowed to go down the road of ‘self insurance’.103 The insurance costs were to be passed 
through product prices to the consumer. As the degree of union-type organisation of the personnel 
permitted, the employers also attempted to offset these costs by reducing salaries.  
                                                     
96 See on this J.F. Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American 
Law, 2004. – On the - often criticised - thesis of the ‘subsidization of economic growth through the torts system’ cf. 
especially M.J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960, 1977, pp. 63. 
97 Witt, The Accidental Republic, 2004. p. 51 (“against public policy”). 
98 I.e. transition from forfeiture of liability to proportional shares (quota) depending on the degree of fault.  
99 The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 US 463 (1908). 
100 Second Employers‘ Liability Cases, 223 US 1 (1912). 
101  Cf. K.S. Abraham, The Liability Century, 2008, pp. 39: the “original tort law reform”. 
102 The first Workers’ Compensation Statute in the US was enacted 1910 in New York and then declared unconstitutional by 
the N.Y. Court of Appeals: Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431 (1911): “The statute, judged by our common law 
standards, is plainly revolutionary.” It required an amendment to the state’s constitution of New York and a judgement of 
the US Supreme Court (243 U.S. 188 (1917)), stating the compatibility with the US Constitution, to bring the Statute 
finally into legal force.  
103 See especially P.V. Fishback/S.E. Kantor, A Prelude to Welfare State: The Origins of Workers’ Compensation, 2000. 
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2. Railway, Automobile, and Airplane 
a) The Railway 
Soon after its breakthrough in 1830 in England, the railway took off in the USA. The railroad created 
America. In 1840, the railways spanned less than 3000 miles; in 1850, 9000 miles; in 1860, 30000; 
and in 1870 the railways stretched to 53000 miles. 104 In respect of liability for accidents, the common 
law of torts, i.e. negligence, dominated here too.  
To this extent, the common law shared a peculiarity with the Roman law of receptum liability. It 
traditionally recognised the quasi-contractual strict liability of common carriers of goods. Common 
carriers105 are today state-regulated transport undertakings, which offer freight and public 
transportation services. To the category of common carriers belong amongst others airlines, railways, 
bus companies, and taxi firms. In the 19th century railway companies were strictly liable as common 
carriers only for damage to transported goods. Cases of physical injury to persons, passengers as well 
as railway employees,106 remained under the regime of negligence liability.107 For railway employees, 
this first changed with the passing of the respective Employers’ Liability Acts108 (like FELA 1906), 
and then through the Workmen Compensation Statutes from 1910 onwards. In respect of passengers, 
general contract law and torts law (negligence) persisted.  
An interesting question goes to the responsibility for the damage to third parties, in particular in cases 
of crashes on railway crossings and where animals are on the railways, as well as in respect of damage 
caused by sparks flying from the locomotives.109 In cases of individual wrongful acts of railway 
employees, this was an instance of vicarious liability. Where no such wrongs obtained (the majority of 
cases), the injured parties had no recourse.  
The conflicts which arose from this over the distribution of damages between the land owners, who 
are legally using their premises, and the legal operation of the ‘risky’ railways belong to the since 
forgotten history of strict liability in the USA. From the middle of the 19th Century onwards many 
states enacted so-called Spark Fire Statutes and Cattle Injury Statutes. These made the railway  liable 
for all damage caused in its running without fault.110 None of these rules remains in force today. They 
disappeared with those specific risks. The relevant law is again the general law of torts.  
Railway liability served in these times of unprecedented societal change as a fertile ground for legal-
political debate. This is made clear by an oft-cited case: Ryan v. New York Central R.R. (1866).111 
Through the sparks from a locomotive, a woodpile on the railway’s own land caught fire. The fire 
spread and engulfed a neighbouring building, which burned to the ground. The owner brought a 
                                                     
104 J.F. Stover, American Railroads, 1961, pp. 19, 26, 144/145. 
105  On the traditional liability of Common Carriers’ cf. O.W. Holmes, Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 Am. L. 
Rev. 609 (1879); J.H. Beale, The Carrier’s Liability, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 158 (1898). 
106  This led to claims for the enactment of a Railway Compensation Plan which follows the model of the Workers’ 
Compensation legislation. Cf. A.A. Ballantine, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1916). 
107  On this generally cf. B.Y. Welke, Recasting American Liberty. Gender, Race, Law, and the Railroad Revolution, 1865-
1920, 2001. 
108  The first Employers’ Liability Act covering railways was passed 1856 in Georgia. It abolished the defence of the fellow 
servant rule. 
109  This has also been a favourite academic subject of the Law & Economy analysists. Cf., inter alia, Coase, 3 J.L. & Econ. 
1, 29 et seq. (1960); R. Posner, Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 206 (1973); Grady, 17 J. Legal Stud. 15 (1988). 
110 The Spark Fire Statutes passed the constitutionality tests they were put to by the railway companies, whereas many Cattle 
Injury Statutes had been declared unconstitutional. Cf. Witt, Accidental Republic, 2004, at pp. 135/136 with references. 
111  35 N.Y. 210 (1866). 
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damages action in negligence.112 Even in this case, where carelessness was admitted, the action was 
dismissed. That the building was set alight by the fire which spread from the woodpile of the railway 
company and not directly by the sparks from its locomotive led the court to the conclusion that this 
was an indirect injury to the plaintiff’s property. It presented the problem of imputation; in the 
language of the common law, the issue of proximate cause. The New York Court of Appeals denied 
that the plaintiff’s damage was attributable to the railway (with little persuasive justification), 
declaring the damage too remote.113 The consideration which appeared to have motivated the decision 
was less the protection of the railway companies against excessively high damages claims, and more 
that the party whose property was damaged by fire should bear the burden for taking out (first party) 
insurance for just that risk. Home owners’ first party insurance was already commonly available, 
whereas liability insurance was at the time unknown. 30 years later, with liability insurance available, 
the decision would have been made on the basis of which of the parties might have been the ‘better 
insurer’. (The Court overlooked the circumstance that already in those days the railway company 
could spread the loss by passing on the cost to its customers). 
b) The Automobile 
The automobile was in fact invented in Germany; its ‘second invention’ however happened in the US. 
With the passage to industrial mass production in 1908 (H. Ford’s Model T) the numbers of 
automobiles produced expanded exponentially: In 1900 there were only 8000 cars in the US. 1915 saw 
2 million cars; 1920, 9 million; and 1930, 23 million. 114 Although the automobile took some time 
getting used to, American lawyers did not consider that the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine or the 
principle of ‘strict liability for ultrahazardous activities’115 could be applied to accidents occasioned in 
the propulsion of automobiles. The mantra then was that it was not the car that was hazardous; rather 
the risk was caused by its drivers. In terms of tort liability, car accidents fell and still fall within the 
negligence regime.116  
At the beginning of the 1930s, at the first height of the motorisation wave and indeed the first height of 
motor-accidents, with 30000 deaths in one year, the model of strict liability with obligatory insurance 
was up for debate (the Columbia Plan).117 This Plan was not however followed in the turmoil of the 
world economic crisis. During the second peak of automobile expansion in the 1960s, there was a 
renewed and intensified discussion of automobile safety and of no-fault regimes.118 The legal-political 
reaction was twofold. A new regulatory approach was pursued with the passing of the National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966 by which a safety agency was established.119 The law 
                                                     
112  “by careless management or through the insufficient condition of its [the sued railway company] engines”. Organisational 
fault or per-se culpable activity? 
113  The spreading of the fire to the neighbouring house of the plaintiff was regarded not to be the ‘natural and expected 
result’ of the burning of the woodpile on the railway company’s premise.  
114 For figures cf. Abraham, Liability Century, at p. 70 
115  On both see below in the text. 
116  For the US: inter alis, Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1968); for England: Wing v. London General Omnibus Co. 
[1909] 2 KB 652. 
117  Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Auto Accidents to Columbia University Council for Research in the 
Social Sciences, 1932. 
118  R. Keeton/J. O’Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: A Blueprint for Reforming Automobile Insurance, 1965; 
for more detail on this subject see Abraham, Liability Century, pp. 92.  
119  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). For critical accounts of the outcomes of this safety 
administration cf. S. Peltzman, Regulation of Automobile Safety, 1975; J.L. Mashew/D.L. Harfst, The Struggle for 
Automobile Safety, 1990. 
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concerning liability remained unchanged. Most states introduced compulsory liability insurance; 
several other states installed various forms of no-fault first party insurance.120 
c) The Airplane 
Liability for domestic air traffic accidents in the US did not follow in a straightforward manner the 
well trodden path of railway, motor vehicle and maritime law, i.e. the negligence system. The law 
changed when aviation developed. In the early days of aviation damage to person and property on the 
ground was to the fore. In contrast to the driving of automobiles, the operation of aircrafts was 
regarded as an ultrahazardous activity and the operators were held strictly liable for all damage caused 
by airplanes. As early as 1922 this principle was also expressed in the Uniform Aeronautics Act. Its 
section 5 providing for strict liability has been adopted by a large number of states. The view that  
aviation was ultrahazardous dominated also the discussions and proceedings of the American Law 
Institute (ALI) when drafting the First Restatement of the Law of Torts in the 1930.121 Doubts as to 
whether aviation is an ultrahazardous activity began to increase after World War II. The first to face 
this new approach were the passengers. Courts often dismissed their claims because of assumption of 
the risk of flying. Other courts applied the doctrine of a rebuttable presumption of fault of the air 
carrier. The Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1977 passed – after highly controversial discussions 
within the ALI – a new paragraph 520A. Addressing only the problem of damage to person or 
property on the ground caused by airplanes, a majority of ALI members adhered to the position that 
the damage results from an “abnormally dangerous activity”. The Third Restatement has now left this 
question explicitly unanswered.122 The prevailing approach nowadays is quasi-strict liability for air 
carriers. They and their personnel have to use utmost care and in case of an accident a breach of care is 
presumed. 
International flights are under the umbrella of the respective International Conventions. The US 
ratified the Warsaw Convention 1934; today the Montreal Convention of 1999 is in force with its two-
tiered system of liability as far as passengers and their baggage are concerned.123 Crew members are 
under workmen compensation schemes and general torts law respectively. 
3. Strict Liability for Particularly Hazardous Activities 
Next to the important case of statutory strict liability of employers in cases of industrial accidents 
(workers’ compensation) and the historical strict liability for railways, the common law in the US 
seems to recognise strict liability only in a very limited area: liability for ultrahazardous activities. 124  
This development is also, in the American common law, closely connected to the English case of 
Rylands v Fletcher stemming from the 1860s (which at first blush seemed to be an odd starting point 
for a law of strict liability125 as it was indubitably a case of negligence): 126 
                                                     
120  Cf. Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th edn, 1984, pp. 600, 
121 ALI, Restatement of the Law: Torts, vol. 3, 1938, see comments to § 520. For more detail on the subject of strict liability 
for ultrahazardous activites and the ALI-Restatement movement see below in the text. 
122  ALI, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, vol. 1, 2010, p. 272. 
123 See above in the text. 
124  A second (hybrid) area is the liability for ‘defective’ products which in French and American law developed out of the 
contractual warranty liability. Products liabililty is internationally treated as a special case. In the US the liability for 
manufacturing defects (flaws) is strict; according to a prevailing view design and warning defects are under a negligence 
liability. Cf. ALI, Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability, 1998; Owens, Products Liability, 2d edn. 2008. 
125  In the English common law it never assumed such a function. Rylands belongs here to the law of private nuisance. See 
especially Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; cf. E. Reid, Liability for Dangerous 
Substances (1999) 48 ICLQ 731. The Australian courts did completely away with Rylands and integrated it into 
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J. Rylands ran a large textile factory in a region which was heavily impacted by farming and 
mining. He drilled a small reservoir in the earth in order to provide his factory steamers with 
water. The reservoir burst because the floor underneath was carved out of abandoned mining 
shafts. The escaping water put the neighbouring mining works of Fletcher out of use. Both were 
tenants of the land, owned by the Earl of Wilton. Rylands had contracted competent engineers to 
construct the reservoir but they did not pay due care. They ought to have inspected the floor of the 
reservoir more closely.  
Fletcher did not however sue the engineers, but sued Rylands, the wealthy industrialist.127 
Vicarious liability was ruled out because Rylands’s engineers were independent contractors and 
not employees. The Court of Exchequer dismissed the action against Rylands. It found that 
Fletcher’s case was not made out on any of the pleaded causes of action (negligence, nuisance, 
trespass). The Appellate Court reversed the first instance decision and granted Fletcher’s claim. 
Mr. Justice Blackburn founded a new strict liability cause of action in the case of highly hazardous 
activities. 128 This decision was upheld in the House of Lords. However, Lord Cairns reverted to 
the underlying neighbour concept: if a person puts their land to an unnatural use, they will be 
liable for damages flowing therefrom irrespective of fault. 
 
Reception of this concept in the USA had two phases.129 In the foreground, was the refusal to 
introduce strict liability for the risks of industrial undertakings in the industrialised states of the North 
East in the 1870s and 1880s. Strict liability was seen as ‘obstacle in the way of progress and impro-
vement’. Representative of this is the well-known case of an exploding steam boiler: Losee v. 
Buchanan.130 It is however noteworthy that outside of liability law there were early attempts by the 
authorities to regulate the safety of the new technical modes of transportation.131 
The second phase began at the end of the 19th Century. The negative effects of unbridled 
industrialisation were impossible to ignore. Mining accidents and spectacular dam bursts led to a 
reconsideration of strict liability à la Rylands v Fletcher. The concern to protect national industry 
against the costs of damages claims decreased at the beginning of the 20th Century. That said, the 
courts made heavy work of the open recognition of strict (‘absolute’) liability.132  
(Contd.)                                                                  
negligence: Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 20; cf. J. Swanton, Another Conquest in the 
Imperial Expansion of the Law of Negligence (1994) 2 Torts L.J. 101. 
126  3 H. & C. 774 (Exch. 1865); L.R. 1 Exch 265 (Exch.Ch. 1866); L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); on this case cf. inter alia, A.W.B. 
Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. Legal Stud. 209 
(1984); K.S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law’s Conscience, in R. Rabin/S. Sugarman (eds), Torts Stories, 2003, 
pp. 207; K. Oliphant, Rylands v. Fletcher and the Emergence of Enterprise Liability in the Common Law, in H. Koziol/B. 
Steiniger (eds), European Tort Law, 2004, pp. 81.. 
127  The second defendant was the chief executive of the factory (i.e. managerial liability)! But this suit was dropped later on. 
128  “We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps 
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie 
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” [1866] LR 1 Exch. 265, 279 (Ex. Ch., 
Blackburn, J.) 
129  Cf. Prosser, The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in Selected Topics on the Law of Torts, 1953, pp. 135; Note, The 
Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 Yale 
L.J. 333 (2000). 
130  51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873): a strict liability standard would “create a liability which would be the destruction of all civilized 
society”; see also Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873) and Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876). 
131  E.g. as early as 1837 Congress had begun to regulate the safety of steamships. Cong. Globe, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 455 
(1837). 
132  Cf. Green v. General Petrolium Corp., 270 P. 952 (1928); Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 
1931); on this generally cf. C.O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951). 
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A watershed moment was when the American Law Institute incorporated Rylands into the First 
Restatement of Torts in the 1930s. § 519 acknowledged strict liability for ultrahazardous activities.133 
In defining what constituted the same, recourse was had to Rylands itself: the magnitude of risk which 
flowed from the activity (Blackburn) and its ‘uncommonality’ relative to the local habits (Cairns). 
Since technical-industrial risks and ‘unnatural’ use did not fit particularly well together, now there is a 
generalised concept referred to as uncommon usage. This is doubly misleading.  
For one thing, the phrase undermines the constitutive moment of the technical risk and its 
contingency. All modern technical risks – from the railway and the steamer to the automobile and 
aircraft up to nuclear power plants – have in a short time become generally accepted common goods. 
Further, it is misleading to refer to usage by the great part of the population,134 in that here, with one 
exception, the car, these activities are not everyday activities of the normal person. Rather, they are 
industrial activities, which are simply not part of the pursuits of the common person. These are per se 
uncommon usages in the sense of the Restatement. These infelicities have not been eliminated in 
further restatements.  
40 years later, § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts listed factors, which the courts should take 
into account when classifying activities as ‘abnormally dangerous’: The first three concern the extent 
of risk; the next two the unusual nature of usage: 135 
 
1. existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; 
2. likelihood that the harm that results will be great; 
3. inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
4. extent to which the activity is not matter of common usage; 
5. inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
6. extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous features. 
 
The last factor contains a new risk-utility element. The liability could in spite of great danger and 
unusual use, fall away where the advantages of the activity for the society outweigh the possible risks. 
The Third Restatement 2010 has limited itself again to the two criteria: particular hazardousness and 
uncommon usage. The public policy reservation was dropped.136  
This Rylands-type liability for hazardous undertakings has in both respects, scope of application and 
extent of case law, remained limited.137 It still has but a residual role in today’s American law of torts. 
 
 
                                                     
133 ALI, Restatement of the Law: Torts, vol. 3, 1938, §§ 519, 520 
134  ALI, Restatement of the Law: Torts, 1938, p. 45: “An activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on 
by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community.” (emphasis added - G.B.) This criterium does indeed 
not allow to qualify driving cars on highways as ultrahazadous activity. 
135  ALI, Restatement (Second) Torts, vol. 3, 1977, §§ 519, 520. 
136  ALI, Restatement (Third) Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, vol. 1, 2010, § 20. 
137  One of the few generally recognised class of cases is explosives: production, storage, transport, application. Cf., inter alia, 
W.K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1705 (1992). 
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4. Characterisation 
For at least 150 years the traditional torts system with negligence liability at its core, which includes a 
‘grass roots’ civil jury that determines the question of negligence in individual states’ courts,138 a 
powerful legal profession and an equally formidable insurance industry has become so deeply rooted 
in American society that attempts to change the system have repeatedly faltered. The new super-tort 
negligence has proved so robust and flexible that it could, next to the traditional liability of human 
beings, also encompass the liability of large scale industrial companies.139 The Learned Hand formula 
or cost-benefit standard of negligence is a representative expression of this enterprise liability.140 The 
individualism of the reasonable person survives in the disguise of the efficient risk taker. 
The one really enduring breakthrough in strict liability succeeded outside the torts system through the 
workers’ compensation legislation. Attacks from the academy urging uptake of this exemplar and 
instantiation of a strict liability concept have thus far had little success.141 Within the torts system this 
seed has not germinated beyond strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. The relevance of 
the hybrid forms of liability between negligence and strict liability such as vicarious liability; statutory 
negligence and strict liability for defective products are however not to be ignored.142  
To summarize: The US torts system is characterised by a fundamental ambivalence: On the one hand 
adherence to individualism under the unifying principle of negligence focusing on responsibility, fault 
and incentives; on the other hand adherence to actuarialism by the balancing of probabilities and 
practicing loss spreading via insurance schemes. The US torts law got struck on its passage from 
individual blame to corporate blame to no-blame; between the morality of corrective justice and the 
neutrality of collective justice. Proposals to do away in parts or as a whole with the allegedly 
fortuitous and expensive torts system for personal injuries remained rare exceptions.143 
Pressing modern problems, which the law of torts cannot or ought not solve are covered outside of the 
common law through no-fault compensation funds. An example of this is the treatment of hazardous 
industrial waste through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
                                                     
138  7th Amendment (1791) of the US Constitution: “In suits at common law, ...., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the US, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”  
139  On the buffer function of negligence between old trespass torts and modern strict liability (“absolute liability”) cf. the 
classic article of C.O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951). See also G.W. 
Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 597 (1999); 
G.E. White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980-2000, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1337 (2001). 
140  United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 169 (2d Cir. 1947); see on this case in greater detail, inter alia, P.J. Kelley, 
Teaching Torts: The Carroll Towing Company Case, 45 St. L.U.L.J. 731 (2001); S.G. Gilles, in Rabin/Sugarman, Torts 
Stories, 2003, pp. 12. The equation N = B < P x L has been made by R. Posner the characteristic of the tort of negligence 
per se: Cf., inter alia, R. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972). But see also R.W. Wright, Hand, 
Posner, and the Myth of the ‘Hand Formula’, 4 [2003] Theoretical Inquiries in Law No.1, Art. 4 (stating after an analysis 
of cases that the Hand formula is an ‘academic myth’). 
141  See especially the law professors W. Douglas, A. Ehrenzweig, L. Friedman, C.O. Gregory, F. James, F. Kessler, W. 
Prosser in the middle of the 20. Century: later on G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, 1970. – As an actual account of 
“strict enterprise liability” cf. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1285 (2001). See also the (unapproved) report to the ALI, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 2 vols, 
1991. 
142  In US products liability law the liability for manufacturing defects (‘flaws’) is strict; the liability for design and warning 
defects is governed by negligence. There is, except few cases like asbestos, no liability for development risks.  Cf. ALI, 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 1998; Owen, Products Liability, 2. edn. 2008. 
143 As a proponent of a comprehensive social insurance scheme cf. S. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law, 
1989; as supporters of a private first party insurance as alternative cf. J. O’Connor, Ending Insult to Injury. No-Fault 
Insurance for Products and Services, 1975; G. Priest, New Legal Structure of Risk Control, 119 Daedalus 207 (1990). – 
In England P.S. Atiyah shifted from an attendent of a social insurance scheme to a proponent of a system of private first 
party insurance. Cf. P. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery, 1997. 
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Act (CERCLA, the so-called Superfund) 1980 or the treatment of the consequences of oil spills through 
the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 1990144 as well as The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
established 2001145. It served to impede tort damages claims being brought against US airlines by the 
relatives of the deceased victim-passengers of the four airplanes crashed by terrorist attacks and for the 
personal injuries on the ground, i.e. the persons killed or injured in and around the twin towers of the 
World Trade Center.146 
                                                     
144  The Act was passed after the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska and provides for a strict liability in cases of oil pollution. 
The damages are however restricted to 75 Mill. US Dollars. 
145 Title IV of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSA) of 22.9.2001. 
146 On this see the report the fund’s special master K.R. Feinberg, What is Life Worth?, 2005  
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III. Russia – The Revolutionary Legacy: General Clauses of Quasi-strict Liability and 
Strict Liability 
1. Tsarist and Soviet Law 
Tsarist Russia at the end of the 19th Century was still a long way from becoming an industrial state 
after the English, German or American model. Its law was compiled in a 15volumes collection of 
statutes, the Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (SZ) from 1833, completed under Tsar Nikolaus I. In the 
1860s Russia set about a great law reform. One target was to adapt the law to the challenges of the 
beginning industrialisation. Already in 1852 a fault liability of railways had been adopted.147 By 1878, 
under German and Austrian influence, Russia amended this provision in Book X of the SZ by a rule of 
presumed fault governing liability of railway and steamship companies for personal injury. The Courts 
of Tsarist Russia developed this into a veritable strict liability, which was only excluded in cases of 
contributory fault of the victim, fault of third parties or force majeure. In 1903, this strict liability was 
extended to factories and mines. 148  
After the adoption of the BGB in the German Empire in 1896, in Russia attempts were also made to 
produce a modern Civil Code. They never came to a conclusion. It is noteworthy that in the last 
completed draft of a law of obligation 1913, there were two elements, which were to influence the 
post-revolutionary law: a general clause for fault liability after the model of the French civil code (§ 
2601) and a rule of no-fault liability for dangerous things (§ 2635).149 World War I and the October 
Revolution of 1817 created an entirely new situation.  
From 1918, the use of Tsarist law was generally forbidden. In the context of the new economic policy 
(NEP) after 1921 certain private economic activities were again permitted. Thus legal gaps became 
visible which needed to be closed. A civil code was drafted quickly for the Russian Socialist Federate 
Soviet Republic (RSFSR)150 and was completed in 1922.151 The Code contained elements of Tsarist 
and foreign civil (French and German) law. The code came into force in 1923 and contained only 435 
short paragraphs. The section on extra-contractual liability contained 13 rules. Its kernel comprised 
two general clauses: 1. liability for damage caused by human conduct (§ 403), and 2. liability for 
damage from sources of heightened danger for their surroundings (§ 404). The latter norm was an 
unspoken continuation of pre-Soviet law of strict liability, but was, in the interests of protecting the 
socialist state property, very narrowly interpreted by the courts.152 Both general clauses were (with 
revolutionary vigour) straightforwardly conceptualised as causal liability.  
In § 403, there were three exclusionary grounds: i) proof that the damage could not be prevented by 
the person; ii) proof that causing the damage was justified; iii) proof that the damage was the result of 
the intention or negligence of the injured party. The first exclusionary ground developed in the late 
1930s into the possibility of proving that one had not behaved negligently. § 403 thus turned into a 
                                                     
147  Art. 683, Book X of Svod Zakonov, ed. 1857. 
148  Regulations of 2.6.1903. 
149  Reprinted by M. Will, Quellen erhöhter Gefahr, 1980, at p. 194. The draft contained also a provision on compensation for 
pain and suffering. – In general to the pre-soviet time cf. W.E. Butler, Russian Law, 3d edn 2009, pp. 15-85; on the law 
of delict cf. C.S. Wölk, Das Deliktsrecht Russlands, 2003, pp. 39 
150  The Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - USSR) came into being on 30. December 1922 as a federation 
of the RSFSR with Ukraine, Belorussia and the Federate Transcaucasian Republic. 
151  Cf. on this generally R. Schlesinger, Soviet Legal Theory. Its Social Background and Development, 1945; N. Reich, 
Sozialismus und Zivilrecht, 1972. 
152  Cf. B. Rudden, Soviet Tort Law, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 583, 606 (inter alia with the example of no-liability of railways for 
damage by escape of sparks under § 404). 
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provision of presumed fault. With regard to § 404, liability was excluded where it was proved that the 
damage flowed from force majeure or from intention/negligence of the injured party. 153 Accidents and 
sickness at the workplace and in private life were the remit of social insurance; private hazards, such 
as car driving, were uninsurable. 154 Both general clauses survived in substance throughout all the legal 
reforms in the Soviet period155 and appear again in the new Russian civil code.  
2. Liability Law of the Russian Federation 
By the end of 1991, the USSR had disintegrated and the individual republics became independent 
again. The Russian Federation was born.156 A new Russian civil code was produced based on the 
‘Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation’ of the USSR and its Republics. The Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation (CCRF) comprises four parts, the last of which came into force in 2008. Liability 
law is found in Part II157, from 26th January 1996, which came into force on 1st March 1996. 158 
a) Quasi-Strict Liability 
§ 1064 embodies the basic norm of liability for fault. It remains bound to its French origins in the 
history of the Russian law of delict. Paragraph 1 contains in its core a general clause à la Art. 1382 of 
the Code Civil: A person who damages another must compensate the damage. It centred on the unified 
concept of damage – not the injury of a legally protected interest. The purity of the French approach is 
diluted by the addition of the defining phrase‚ ‘damage to the person or to the property of a person 
(natural or legal)’. Thereby, immaterial personal values are excluded, which are governed outside of 
the law of delict in Part I by §§ 150-152-1 CCRF. Anyway, what matters is an injury to legally 
protected interests and resultant loss. The ground for liability of § 1064 (1) is the causing of personal 
or property damage or of pure economic loss.  
In contrast to the French model, neither intention nor negligence is mentioned in § 1064 (1). Fault 
features in para. (2): Whoever causes damage in the sense of (1) must show that he was not at fault. 
No exculpation is required where one of the cases of no-fault liability like the strict liability in § 1079 
obtains.159 Fault comprises intention and negligence. 160 Intention is not discussed further, not even 
mentioned. Civil fault is largely equated with negligence for which a definition can be found in § 
401(1) CCRF (law of contract). 161 
                                                     
153  V. Gsovski, Soviet Civil Law. Private Rights and Their Background under the Soviet Regime, 1948, pp. 485-517; A. de 
Faria e Castro, Die Merkmale der unerlaubten Handlung im sowjetischen Zivilrecht unter Berücksichtigung ihrer 
historischen Entwicklung, 1969; B. Rudden, Soviet Tort Law, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 583, 597 et seq. (1967); L. Sólyom, The 
Decline of Civil Liability, 1980, pp. 195-229. 
154  On the complex subject of ‘liability and insurance’ under Soviet law cf. J.N. Hazard, Personal Injury and Soviet 
Socialism, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 545 (1952); B. Rudden, Soviet Insurance Law, 1966. 
155  Cf. especially §§ 88-94 of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and its Republics of 1961 and the 
succeeding civil code of 1964. 
156  Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 states that Russia is „a democratic, federate state governed 
by the rule of law and with a republican form of governance”. Cited from Butler, Russian Law, p. 811. 
157  Chap. 59: Obligations from Causation of Damage. 
158  An English version of the complete Civil Code can be found on the website www.russian-civil-code.com and in print, 
inter alia, in W. Butler, Civil Code of the Russian Federation, 2010. – On the law of delict cf. Wölk, Das Deliktsrecht 
Russlands, pp. 119; H. Oda, Russian Commercial Law, 2d edn. 2007, pp. 339-352. 
159  § 1064 (2) sen. 2 CCRF. 
160  § 401 (1) CCRF. 
161  “A person is considered not to be at fault [!] if under that degree of care and circumspection which was required of him 
according to the nature of the obligation and the conditions of commerce, he took all possible measures for the proper 
performance of the obligation.” 
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This ‘liability for fault’ of the CCRF shares only its name with the European codifications of the 19th 
Century. In fact, this fault liability regime with a regular reversal of the burden of proof for fault 
reveals a quasi-strict liability (which has been set down by the author as a general rule for enterprise 
liability162). Russian liability law goes further and extends it to the personal liability of citizens. This 
corresponds (as emphasised above) with Russian legal tradition since the post-revolutionary Civil 
Code of 1922, and has been maintained in all subsequent reforms. 
Partly evoked by ideological discussions about the role of law in the young USSR, this remained a 
noteworthy step in the emancipation of civil liability from natural law influences of the 18th and 19th 
Centuries, which resonate in West and Central Europe to this day. The functional difference and 
independence of liability law from criminal law is underscored. The (insurable) compensation of 
damages in money in private law has other preconditions than the state-sovereign sanctioning of a 
criminal act through, for example, personal imprisonment. The sharp focus of the CCRF’s liability law 
is on causation of damage and on loss distribution.   
b) Strict Liability 
The second basic norm of Russian liability law is § 1079. It contains a general clause on strict liability 
for sources of heightened risk.163 This norm too can be traced back to the Civil Code of 1922 (§ 404), 
whose precursors originate in the 19th Century. § 404 gave unadulterated expression to the principle 
which was at the bottom of these casuistic provisions of Tsarist law: The user of a hazardous activity 
must bear its risks. Therefore, despite political-systemic upheaval we have here an unbroken 
autochthonous tradition of Russian liability law, which is historically older than the sequence of the 
American Restatements of Torts164 and still more progressive than the recent central European 
proposals for tort law reform. 165  
As sources of heightened danger in the modern § 1079, the following were introduced: Technical 
modes of transportation (railway; steamship; car; aircraft); high voltage electricity; atomic energy; 
explosives; lethal poisons; etc. The owner or operator of these sources of greater danger is liable. It 
can exonerate itself in the case of a damage causing incident only where it can bring the evidence that 
there was an intervening force majeure or that the victim intentionally assumed the risk of harm. 
3. Characterisation 
It was in the aftermath of the October Revolution that the Soviet civil law dramatically broke free of 
the fault principle as a basis for extra-contractual liability which had up to that point determined 
European and US law. The liability law of the civil code of 1922 established exclusively stricter forms 
of liability on the injuring party. It contained two general clauses of liability for the causing of 
damage.166 The first developed into a general liability for presumed fault; the second became a strict 
liability for sources of heightened hazard (especially industrial risks). 
                                                     
162  Brüggemeier, Haftungsrecht, 2006, pp. 117; id., Modernising Civil Liability Law, pp. 70; id., Verschuldenshaftung, 
Unternehmenshaftung, Gefährdungshaftung, in Festschrift H. Rüßmann, pp. 265. 
163  For more detail on this subject cf. Will, Quellen erhöhter Gefahr, pp. 193-232. 
164  On liability for ‘ultrahazardous’ or ‘abnormally dangerous activities’ see above in the text. 
165  Cf. European Group on Tort Law (ed), Principles of European Tort Law, 2005; C. v. Bar/E. Clive/H. Schulte-Nölke 
(eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law. Draft Common Frame of Reference, Book VI: 
Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another, 2009, pp.395. 
166 This structure has a parallel to the law of delict of the new Brazilian Civil Code of 2002. For a version of the Code in 
English cf. L. Rose, The Brazilian Civil Code in English, 2008; see also Brüggemeier, Modernising Civil Liability Law, 
pp. 197. 
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Truly revolutionary for their time, these rules could today, almost a century on, serve as a model of 
liability law for the 21st Century. Both characteristic paths of liability law of the ‘risk society’ are 
present: quasi-strict liability for businesses167 and strict liability for technical risks. The latter, inter 
alia, encompasses a unique coherent regime of liability for all technical modes of transportation. 
Furthermore, both principles are not to be found in some subsidiary provisions or diffuse case law, but 
are in the very heart of the civil code. They furnish the best conditions for the elaboration of a concise 
scientific doctrine of strict liability or Gefährdungshaftung as an integral component of personal injury 
law of the ‘risk society’. That said, there is still room for improvement also in Russian law.  
                                                     
167  Enterprise liability for systemic fault is also covered by § 1064. Individuals’ fault liability should be separated as a third 
track (without reversal of the burden of proof for fault). 
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IV. Conclusion 
It is not by coincidence that the jurisprudence of civil liability law is internationally clinging on the 
grand old tradition of the Roman and natural law’s responsibility for fault, as it has classically been 
framed in the French civil code of 1804: liability for one’s wrongful act; liability for the wrongful acts 
of others (servants/children); and some special cases of no-fault liability for things 
(animals/buildings). If one leaves this classic world of individual responsibility and starts envisaging 
the different world of industrial modernity and its law of liability, the classical model soon loses its 
appropriateness. An irritating variety of depersonalised ‘stricter’ forms of enterprise liability has been 
developed, both openly and calmly, by special legislation and by case-law. In part liability has been 
substituted by insurance, e.g. state social insurance. Balancing of probabilities and risk absorption by 
the best loss spreader have replaced the fault rationale. As far as physical injuries by the 
materialisation of technical risks are concerned the law of delict has in continental Europe been 
replaced by insurance schemes or liability law operates in the meantime like an insurance system. 
Finally compensation of damages ends as a loss distribution by collectivities (via damage division 
agreements between insurers). In last resort the general public pays twice – as taxpayers and as 
customers of products and services. The advantage is that neither the business risk-taker nor the 
fortuitous risk exposed victim is left with the full burden of the damages or losses. Perhaps the US 
torts system is haunted by so many crises because it is farther away from this hotchpotch of insurance 
coverage and depersonalised responsibility than continental Europe. With respect to the law in the 
books the Russian law seems to be best of all and most attuned to the legal challenges of 
industrialisation. A ‘grand theory’ of the mixed liability law of the industrial modernity or ‘risk 
society’ is not in sight. Systematising the chaos resembles the clean-up of Augeas’ stables by 
Hercules. But Hercules may prove to be Godot. 
 
  
 
